Some methodological sophistication in the difference between the words terror and war

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Abstract: The criteria of the difference between terrorism and war: social places, means of communication, weapons of war and terror, public bodies are presented and argued in the article. War is prosecuted on the territory of the native land, terrorist and counterterrorism operations are not localized (nomadic places). War ceases communication and forms enemy image; terrorism declares about itself and is characterized by connectivity. The means of warfare are the armed forces of the state. Terrorism privatizes weapon that is free in the world of production and exchange. War disciplines and forms war corporality. Terrorism (Islamic) is based itself on a genetic affected corporality. The authors assume to research the types of corporality, which constitute the essence of terrorism and war. It is necessary to differentiate the types of corporality: the corporality that is affected by the discipline, management and obedience (the corporality of a soldier) and the passive one is affected by the corporality of the Islamic fighter, who is capable of committing suicide bombings in an “irrational state”.

Key words: Terrorism; Terrorist act; War; War and terrorism discourses

1. Introduction

As a rule, no philosophers are interested in the difference between war and terror. Everything is clear to them, the gist is the same: death, violence, injustice, pain, despair and others. The ungrateful assignment of a philosopher is to come to the conceptual ideas in all things, whatever it might be traumatizing. It was so that Alain Badiou had defined his task, having called his article “Philosophical sanctions as to some recent events”. The article told about the terrorist acts of September 11 in the USA (Badiou, 2002). Before reasoning about the facts of the “hot history” (France, Paris, 2015, Russia, the crashed civil plane), one should consider whether these events are repetitive or something other; then we shall have to find out what their sources are, what the reasons are, there will be the continuation.

First, let us sum up those definitions of the term “terrorism”, which were offered by the French thinker. He noted that the term “terrorism” had three functions. They are as follows:

1) Terrorism defines the person, at whom the terrorism act is aimed, the one who is struck, fallen into mourning; therefore, he must revenge, having fought back. The French President expressed his attitude in the form of the simple link-verb: we are being at war, admitted to approve the existence of that awful state in which the French are, and all Europeans, it is the war. The President of Russia expressed his anger in respect of future, opportunities or assumptions, some kind of the super strong answer: the revenge will be awful. The difference is that the melancholic affirmation of F. Hollande: it is the war, not eliminated, as it confirms the state of hostilities, whereas the assumption of the future (V.V. Putin’s answer) admits retreat, criticism, to cut the long story short, the future revenge can be not only postponed, but also it can be disproved. I think that nobody will dispute the difference between the Cartesian discourse of F. Hollande and the mythological discourse of the Russian President, for such features of those people’s mentality, which are represented by their leaders.

2) The word “terrorism” is used by the state to denote any wild and/or armed opponent, just because of his having non-state views. Systematically, only the state has the right to use armed forces against other state, in that case it declares militancy through the exchange of notes by means of Foreign Ministers. Therefore, in Badiou’s opinion, terrorism is not a war, but the coercive actions of a non-state person in relation to whom such forms as anti-terrorist or counterterrorism operations, police operations, forces for order maintenance, etc. are used. These words were mainly used by the Russian President for denoting the operation in Chechnya, anytime he did not speak about the war. The Chechen war is a journalistic slogan, but not the state and political one.

Badiou considers the transition from terrorist activities (the adjective “terrorist”) to the noun “terrorism” to be essential. It is that case when the form becomes the essence in a hidden way. The thread of his thought is quite obvious for the French discourse: the transition from the adjective “terrorist” to the noun “terrorism”. Let us try to work with this thesis theoretically: the use of the adjective

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“terrorist” admits its binding to such nouns as terrorist action, t.e. it emphasizes the meaning of a quite usual act of aggression. In any street quarrel between the representatives of different nationalities, it cannot be distinguished if it is just an act of aggression or terrorism. It is necessary to eliminate the ambiguity of the wordage “terrorist action” instead of a casual affect, temporary bitterness, indifference to the possible consequences, etc. by the psychological, political and legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons. When any aggressive action can be called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the word terrorist is excessively “strong” in reference to the feeling that the definition is incorrectly used; the called as a terrorist one, the person has a concern, legal reasons.

The substitution of the adjective “terrorist” for the noun “terrorism” means the substantivization of that content that becomes important excessively and super valuable. Before terrorism (the form becomes the essence in a hidden way), one must construct a certain conceiving of oneself “We” as it happened to the French (All of us are Charlie Hebdo, or to be simpler “We are Charlie …”). When appeared an idea of plurality (United Europe, European nations, etc.) instead of the singular form “I can fall a victim to the act of terrorism”, there arises the feeling of power, euphoria of plurality and the feeling of immortality (All of us will not be killed). It is that rare case when the European “I” that means small and pathetic is substituted by the grammatical plurality “We” before a faceless and tongueless barbarian (Islamist). The effect of otherness “They, but not we”, this is other terrorism for us - the Islamic barbarian is achieved in the naming of “We” (Badiou’s expression). It is noted that Europe had had its own terrorism - the Italian (“Red Brigades”), German and French Maoism in the spirit of Cohn-Bendit, etc. However, nobody connects this historical form of the European extremism with the modern terrorism today. Badiou argues further: terrorism is a non-existent substance and a form word that can be filled. The absolutely strict philosophical statement sounds so: any substantivization of a formal adjective demands the dominating predicate. Today the assumed substantive carrier of what is called “terrorism” cannot but receive the predicate “Islamic” that it is limited to the affirmation of that fact that the political instrumentation of religion takes place. Badiou warns: when religion that is an item of a subjective and extremely disobedient, is instrumented in the hands of cunning and cruel politicians, people should be extremely careful.

3) Let us refer to the symbolical register of terrorism. Act of terrorism as a symbol represents the message, the announcement of something and demonstration. It is obvious that some acts of terrorism are a simple message, just to know that we are others, contain more expanded message. Act of terrorism does not cease communication, parties continue to exchange transactions what awful they would not be. In a symbolical exchange the true aspirations, values and sense communicate, t.e. terror is related to morality. The liberal point of view which is used in the French literature, journalism and philosophy is as follows: the problem of voice and its absence - here is the route along which the thought can lie (Sophie Vanish) (Vanish, 2003). Let us study out the following arguments: the western society that is too safe and comfortable concludes itself in the concept “My existence … as the existence of another”. Therefore, it cannot see itself as the addressee of other message (Islamic).

The western society sees this message as an obstacle and itself as a target as what these others (Islamic barbarians) are aimed at, t.e. to destroy. To solve the moral problems concerning the protection of “insiders” from “outsiders”, the West actively uses the facts of its cultural code such as the valuable ruins, the Christian sacred things and the life of a “white” person being destroyed by these barbarians. Following Giorgio Agamben, we shall notice that the naming “terrorist” includes the disqualification of all those who identify themselves with Islam, all those who threaten, all those who are armed and all those who at least resemble them. "The Ancient Greeks had no one word for denoting what we usually mean when saying "life". They used two words, dating back to one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be one etymon, but which are various in semantic and morphological: ZOE means the fact of life, the general for all living beings (whether it be animals, people or Gods) and BIOS means the state, to be
the question of the action subjectifying and admits punishment without guilt.

2. Methodology

The main method of the research was the philosophical hermeneutics represented by W. Dilthey and G. Gadamer; we proved it in our previous work (Kirsanova and Korotina, 2015). Feeling or getting into present as the method of Dilthey’s hermeneutics allows remaining the contemporaries of terrorist attacks in which the general life is endangered, and simultaneously, individualizing themselves as a researcher. It was necessary to add the intersubjective exchange with the speculations of intellectuals - political scientists, historians, writers and philosophers to the availability of feeling sympathy, fear and alarm.

In an effort to understand terrorism and war, the intersubjectivity of the philosophical society allowed objectifying experience, basing on the distance method of G. Gadamer.

The analytics of sciences about genius is based on the peculiarities of the language expression, words, which this phenomenon is described. The difference between the metaphorical and logical-grammatical writing, derived by J. Derrida allowed finding out the ambiguity of the voice traffic between the western and Islamic discourses.

The use of the methodology by G. Deleuze, G. Agamben and M. Foucault allowed the authors to base themselves upon the analytics of corporality. The disciplines and techniques of the west-european civilization are different from the life of the genetic body of the Arab East.

3. Results

The difference between terrorism and war is not quite settled in philosophy. We suggest using the following criteria for the characteristic of that content, which is viewed as terrorism and/or war: social places, means of production (weapon), ways of communication and collective bodies. The place is not a landscape; it is that we call as “arche” (the fatherland, the homeland) that creates the alibi for the war discourse, whereas terrorism is a nomadic space (Ranciere, 1995). All that bring the strength of force and fire into action is referred to the means of war and terrorism. A rifle creates a soldier. The quantity of arms that is available presses through its use. Means of communication are the ways of legitimizing the terrorist discourse: the announcement of violence as the act of terrorism even when its reason is unknown. War ceases communication. Act of terrorism and its consequences bring different public bodies into contact: the affected terrorist’s corporality (the die-hard, etc.) and the balanced disciplined corporality of a European person (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). The analytics of corporal practices opens the revolting, perverse, affected bodies, and also the bodies of discipline and obedience, t.e. subjective and sovereign bodies for us.

4. Discussion

Let us study out the argument: the right to speak that at least assumes two registers: what is spoken, anyway there are things and the one who speaks behind the words. Modern mythology claims that words and things are different (Bodrijjar, 2003). Democracy for East does not assume the national independence and human rights do not correspond to the right to dispose of the resources of their own country and so forth. Everything is right; however, the alternative truth is always concealed under the myth. Myth tells the truth. R. Barthes devoted the book “Mythologies” to the foundation of this thesis. “Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to speak about them, but it clears them, makes them harmless and finds them in the eternal and invariable nature, clarifies the affirmation of the fact” (Barthes, 1989). The surface of the Anglo-Saxon mythology is a human right and does not conceal the fact that it is about the rights of a white person, the man and the owner, the truth is that the strong man’s right to take what it does not belong to him. No matter what the verbal rhetoric might mask reality with worthless and form words, the consciousness of people begins to oppose lie and to distinguish “other” truth. The Islamic world articulates itself from the place where there is oil, and the ponder ability of this “word” is that it cancels all other arguments: there is a resource war. The second side of the right to speak assumes the answer to the question who speaks. Who speaks? It is necessary to understand that the value of argumentation, a support on proofs, ability to hold thesis is the values of the Western world along with the truth, beauty and benefit. The central figures of the Christian civilization are Apostles Pavel, Origen, Augustine, Akvinat, and the objectivation of oneself or self-objectivation is the principle of the political and social life of the Western world. Islam appeals affects: excessive violence, silent bitterness, indifference to torments as others, and adherence to fire and destructions, hatred, despair, envy and so forth. Deleuze, the expert of Spinoza’s ethics, arranges affect reasons out of individuality because of what our ability to power over our desires decreases or it is entirely blocked. “It is necessary to distinguish between two types of affects: the actions, explained by the nature that was affected by individuality, following from its essence and the sufferings originating out of individuality. Ability to be affected is filled with sufferings, passive affects. “Gloomy states” (passive affects) represent the lowest step of our power: that moment when we are most of all separated from our ability to act, when we are most of all aloe, given to the phantoms of superstitions and mystifications ..” (Deleuze, 2000). Affects as passive states having the external reason are always equivalent to disability, whereas the speech and action belong to free and passive states,
according to the word, as they are based on knowledge of themselves, things, ideas and so forth. It can be assumed that the person exists as if he were in two streams - in a continuous stream of affects, passions; the other stream is connected with rationality, the necessity of definitions, searching for proofs, complex ideas formulation and articulation (Derrida, 2000). Therefore, the right to speak not rather just to vest with, this right needs to be arrogated and subjectified (Marinetti, 1986). In relation to the Islamic world, it is more than necessary; I consider the traditional weakness of the Islamic divinity, except for Sufism. Theological treatises serve not so much the purposes of faith objectivation (this business of theologicians), as the problems of self-objectivation of believers. It can be very much that attempts to speak from the place of the believing Islamist seem to us awkward today (Zhizhekh, 2014). Not to forget the parable: “One monk had an awful accent of his native Calabria in the Assisiensis monastery. The monks laughed at him. He was sensitive and ceased to talk if it was only not necessary to warn about something unforeseen, about misfortune, about any event which was so important in itself that his accent could remain unnoticed. Meanwhile, he liked to talk: it happened that he had thought out accidents. As he was sincere, he managed to cause them (Polani, 2000).

Terrorism and war, what kind of wars do we make, is it possible to speak about war or is it necessary to deny the same war, and the armed operation, armed conflict? Can we call war the event that puts us on pain of death? Then this definition will be qualified as natural disasters, flood, tsunami, tornadoes and just accidents. To reason of war and its difference from terrorism, it is necessary to set criteria, which allow defining the concept of something strict, but not broad or metaphorical sense. We suggest using the following criteria for the characteristic of war: places, a means of production (weapon), a means of communication and collective bodies. The place is not just the place where the weapon is used, this suitable place that guarantees the legitimacy of arms using and, consequently, an alibi for military presence, and also the stability of the political and state discourse. It is clear that capital is mostly reliable at factories and in banks; the worker is at a machine tool and the soldier in his homeland and protects his Motherland. The real war is patriotic, in people as a full whole, but not ethnoses, classes or elite fighting for survival. The word “war” contains the unified and civil opposition. War is the “arche”, the unity for each nation, for one and all, it is the war, in which there is such form of connectivity of all with all that is called one destiny and even fate. Civil opposition is referred to what can be split up, broken up to pluralities - ethnic, class, social, religious, etc. when the nation does not realize itself as a political and state whole; therefore it cannot be at war. The Russian State and its armed forces can be in the state of the armed conflict in Syria, for instance, or somewhere else, but the nation as “arche”, as the primary element and the prime cause of the whole, cannot be faithful to a war event. Fidelity to an event, participation in it admits both the rational and intuitive moments, which indicate only the degree of this whole maturity, but not its absence. When arisen the need for the common goal, the Russians read “War and Peace by L Tolstoy on all radios and TV channels for four days.

Unlike war as “arche”, terrorism as well as counterterrorist operations is part of the policy of the Western, Russian and Chinese countries are the continuation of modern science and technologies, played into the system of the “double” standards of morals. Act of terrorism submits to the scheme of the cause and effect relationships, which the mind uses, it does not make any failure in the existence or any defect in ability to think. Terrorism is a reflection of our ability to learn the world, to influence world processes and to subordinate them to our interests. It was historically developed so that Europe and America had ensured the rich and comfortable existence earlier than other people and at their expense, having called themselves the center of the civilized world. It is no wonder that there were enclaves of the “uncivilized” existence - Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, etc. on their periphery. These countries try to break through the civilization belt in the different ways today - terrorism, migration, creation of the “Islamic” state. In the European closed space of comfort and wellbeing, such penetration of “abnormal” individuals is considered by the “rights” as something unreasonable and intolerant, and the liberals consider it as an opportunity to carry out the civilization mission. During a small interval of time, there observed the shift in the liberals’ meanings: at first they meant “mission” by education, vocational schools for migrants, social benefits and civilization advantages, but now they mean the examination of the migratory environment by police methods, cordons, creation of places for deduction and control, etc. Moreover, the voices of euro politicians, meeting inhabitants who show greater sympathy, with their intention to remove the borders of the “deviation” to Turkey and Africa, can be heard. It means that the remarkable western “machine” of mind either broke down, or is significantly broken.

Someone another as “the black demon” comes to the house of the European, takes his place at a gas station, in a supermarket, in the street, in the bar, it is qualified as damage and an Attempt upon the European values. The word-mana “the European values” does not affect the representatives of the body-ZOE. The practice in conjunction, pacification and propitiation provokes migrants' opposite affects such as hatred, envy, aggression and rage. It is necessary to address the criterion of corporeality to understand the difference between those public bodies, which made contact. The mind of a western person teaches the public body obedience and order by means of technologies. M. Foucault’s work “To supervise and punish” about the totalitarian zing practices of the power through school, hospital,
prison, army was adopted from the western mentality. It is necessary to distinguish “political technologies” within a certain science about police by means of which the state appropriates and cares about the natural life of individuals and “technology of themselves” by means of which the process of subjectification and submission leading to the fact that the individual appears to be connected with his own identity and consciousness and, simultaneously, he is subordinated to the external control (Foucault, 1996). The Islamic public body perceives the techniques of the civilization as external ones in relation to itself as abstract ones, violating their biological and religious body schema. It is appropriate to remember the difference between the Dionysian and Apollonian corporality, which Nietzsche had attempted long before when there was a current civilization collision. Any public body represents a battlefield between the body-ZOE and the social body, the only difference is that there prevailed an impulse of spontaneous forces, connected with the biological human nature (affects and passions, according to Spinoza,) in one body; order, discipline and form forces are prevailed in the other. The Dionysus cult is an element that the person is capable to break in either the external act (a fivefold namaz) or to overwork internally in the form of ideology, outlook and moral (Bourdieu P., 1991). Why is the terror? Why is the weapon? Does the rifle give birth to the person? There objectified the “fight” of materials in a weapon as it is: biological material (person) makes inhuman things such as steel and fire, t.e. he becomes the means of domination and destruction. The weapon as a means of total destruction (war as a Dionysian field; this idea belongs to Ernst Jünger) possesses the Dionysian forces and coincides with them until fully merged (Jünger, 2000).

It is much simpler to take possession of “mechanical death” such as rifle than any other tool - a tractor, machine or even a plough. The affected public bodies connect with the destructive force of arms and act as a unified power of steel and fire (Sjuria, 2003). Apostle Pavel compares faith with action (vow and work - the unioridual phenomena), love with hard work and hardships. Vow as well as work is referred to firmness, persistence and patience. Act of terrorism is an instant and formal action: Bang! You are in Abraham bosom. Allah’s soldiers are a usual phrase, but is there any contradiction here? The soldier, who is turned into the instrument of another man’s will, is only capable in external submission, he is not a mister of himself, and he is the slave of faith. That is how, for instance, T. Suzuki states the Zen obedience: “When a blow is struck on silicium, the spark is cut from it, and there is no temporary gap between these events. If it is ordered: “To the right!” you must turn to the right at a lightning speed. If anyone’s name is cried out, for instance, “Uemon” you must just answer “I”, but not to think why your name is cried out” (Zhizhek, 2009). According to this approach, it can be assumed that Allah’s soldier does not act as an identity, he is completely affected by another, he is not himself, but he is a striking sword.

Terror and attempt, one more conceptual link that will allow us to define terrorism as an existential experience. The atmosphere of a modern western person’s life, as well as the Russian’s is an Attempt; we live under the sign of the fact that somebody attempts us. “The slightest disorder, accident, earthquake, the failed house and bad weather - this is an attempt, too. Therefore, the growth of wrecking, terrorism and gangsterism is not so much interesting as the fact that all events are interpreted as an attempt. The nature and political actions are merged in one category: attempt. It must be so in the rational system: ANY accident must be only attributed to someone’s human will; therefore, any trouble is regarded as damage or, in the political context, as an attempt upon the public order. Some political groups are just engaged in taking the responsibility for this or that accident or an act of terrorism, whose origin is unknown, “all their practice” is to turn any case into the subversive activity” (Bodrijar 2h., 2006). Terror is different from tsunami, flood, earthquake, etc. by the fact that the natural and technogenic catastrophes do not go beyond the “accident”, which nobody is responsible for. Even oil spillage from the tanker is only conditionally “guilty” because there are the forces of the sea, elements, the preset defects of technical means and so forth behind the accident. An attempt is the result of someone’s evil intention, this someone’s wrecking, and so, somebody must be responsible for it. The necessity to answer causes the figure of “Punishment” that is capable to call the Hell forces upon the head of enemies.

The situation of War and Attempt is different. War assumes the enemy that is spatially localized and separated from us by the national frontier, the public communication with him is ceased. Moreover, the adverse party articulates itself as an enemy, extends notes of protest, threatens and so forth. Each of the parties defines itself from the place of the nation and state. “The Islamic state” is a perverse place, t.e. it is nomadic. The nomadic life of the one, who attempts, makes him misidentifiable, t.e. more dangerous than all the former enemies (it is known, where America and Germany are, but nobody knows where the Islamic state is). The one who attempts is not spatially localized; he has no place, to be more exact, he is everywhere, in each point of the public space, he can find himself in the most unexpected way. “The potential victims” are in the state of paranoia, acts of terrorism can take place worldwide, at any time, and we cannot foresee them and escape. War is not so prosecuted: it is clear where insiders and outsiders are in the war, for this reason, terrorism is not a war. The symbolical register of terrorism is always behind towards the fact without any articulation (the Russian plane crash and the announcement of the terroristic act) is of great importance. People are in fear, alarm and danger. The name gives relief, despite the tragic register of values, t.e. the number of the dead and wounded, means of explosion, etc. The name of the one, who
attempts, possesses the feature of the demon: he was
the owner of the cafe or the employee of the airport
yesterday, and he is a terrorist today, so attempt ... 
all and nobody. Suddenly, there appears the enemy,
and the “soldier” who performs the elimination
functions. A new subjectivity that challenges the
possibility of the response to the appeal of another
was formed. Should we call the Islamist: who are
you? Can we receive the answer from the one who is
not included into the register of the one who calls? I
shall explain: Abraham? - Here I am, the response is
possible only because his faith is great, and he has it,
because he knows God.

The terrorist corporal machine is not an Islamic
religious body as it can be assumed, it is a Gestalt. As
Jünger showed by the example of a worker, Gestalt is
not the set of parts; it is something transcendental in
relation to a certain Islamist, to the mass of the
Islamic people and even to the Muslim corporality.
The public body of the Islamist is a Gestalt that is
indifferent concerning bodies by means of which it
constitutes itself - the Englishman, the Frenchman,
the Russian, and the Arab, only the bodies of this
cruel and ruthless mechanism.

5. Conclusion

The authors assume to research the types of
corporality, which constitute the essence of
terrorism and war. It is necessary to differentiate the
types of corporality: the corporality that is affected
by the discipline, management and obedience (the
corporality of a soldier) and the passive one is
affected by the corporality of the Islamic fighter, who
is capable of committing suicide bombings in an
“irrational state”.

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